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Europe's Uprooted People

The Relocation
of Displaced Population



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Europe's Uprooted People

THE RELOCATION OF DISPLACED POPULATION

CONTENTS

Foreword

I. INTRODUCTION	2
OUTLOOK FOR RELOCATION	
FUTURE DISPLACEMENTS	
THREE-WAY RELOCATION	
II. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE DISPLACEMENT...	5
SCALE OF DISPLACEMENT	
The Leith-Ross Estimates	
The Kulischer Estimates	
CHARACTER OF DISPLACEMENT	
Impact of Modern War	
Product of Ideological Policies	
Manpower Requirements	
III. INSTRUMENTS OF RELOCATION.....	12
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS	
ROLE OF UNRRA	
WORK OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COM- MITTEE ON REFUGEES	
The I. G. C. Reorganizes	
UNRRA'S OTHER COLLABORATORS	
The International Red Cross Committee	
The International Labor Organization	
Role of Private Agencies	
IV. THE TASKS OF RELOCATION.....	19
INTERIM MEASURES	
From Improvisation to Coordination	
Shorter-Term Measures	
Pre-Repatriation Services	
Employment Service	
Longer-Term Measures	
Parenthesis on Statelessness	

ASPECTS OF REPATRIATION

Prisoners of War

To and From Germany

A Word of Warning

Transportation Riddles

Economic Conundrums

Jewish Hopes and Fears

POSSIBILITIES OF ABSORPTION

Relative Responsibilities

Refugees in U. S.

"Free Zones"

Refugees in Britain

Absorptions Elsewhere

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES

Current Attitudes to Migration

Economic Doubts

Political Difficulties

Resultant Opportunities

Aids to Refugee Migrants

GROUP RESETTLEMENT

Determining Factors

Enclaves Not Desired

A "Marginal" Comment

Past Success and Failure

League of Nations Settlements

Settlement in Palestine

Other Resettlement Efforts and Projects

Future Enterprise

The Economics of Refugee Resettlement

Ethical Sine Qua Non

V. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS__ 45

SPECIFIC MEASURES

Organizational Procedures

Relocation Policies

Juridical Questions

GENERAL MEASURES

Economic Cooperation

Political Cooperation

FOREWORD

Millions of Europeans are being liberated from Nazi domination by the Allied Armies. Their liberation is the cause for rejoicing throughout the world, but the Nazis—though driven out—are leaving complex problems to harass the United Nations and the liberated peoples for many years.

Of all the stupendous tasks of relief and rehabilitation none will require sounder planning, harder work and a more sympathetic understanding of human needs than that of assisting the people who have been forced from their homes—and often their families—due to the war and to deliberate Nazi policies. There are untold numbers of these people. Some estimates say twenty millions, some say thirty millions, but everyone who has studied the tremendous migrations which have taken place immediately before and during the war agree that the number is staggering.

The reasons for this mass migration are varied; their main similarity lies in the fact that most were Nazi-inspired. People have fled from battle zones; they have been interned by belligerent countries; they have sought refuge or have been interned for political, racial or religious reasons; they have been forcibly deported from their homelands for slave labor or military service, to make room for transplanted Germans, and for other purposes which the Nazis believed would consolidate the German position in a "Greater Europe."

After liberation the first natural impulse of most of these uprooted people will be to go home. Many of them can and will return to their homes and families. Many others can not, for unavoidable reasons—economic, social and political. Only the most careful planning and the cooperative action of all agencies and governments concerned can avert chaos and further tragedy for the unhappy victims of dislocation.

Europe's Uprooted People, fifth in the series of reports from NPA's Special Project on Relief and Rehabilitation, considers the causes, the character, and probable magnitude of dislocation. It analyzes the respective roles to be played by UNRRA, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, as well as the facilities and responsibilities of other cooperating agencies, such as the ILO. It examines the various phases of the over-all problem, including the timing and overlapping of interim and long-term measures, possibilities for repatriation, absorption, and group resettlement. It sets forth the economic, political and juridical questions

involved; and it proposes both specific and general measures for the solution of international aspects of the problems of displacement and relocation.

Because it is impossible in a single pamphlet to do justice to the world-wide problem of uprooted people, this report does not consider the relocation of dislodged people within national frontiers or displaced persons outside Europe. The fact that these subjects are not treated, by no means implies that they are unimportant. On the contrary, they are of grave importance. It is NPA's intention, assuming that ways and means are found, to continue its study of uprooted people and to issue a report on the Oriental aspects of displacement.

This report, like others in the NPA series on Relief and Rehabilitation, is the result of combined staff and committee investigation, under the direction of Mr. Clarence E. Pickett, member of the Board of Trustees and Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee. The study of the whole question of displaced persons is sponsored by a Subcommittee composed of: Mr. Eugene Burgess, Vice President of General Mills, Inc.; Dr. Joseph P. Chamberlain, Professor of Public Law, Columbia University; Mr. Morris L. Cooke, Consulting Engineer; Mr. Marion H. Hedges, Director of Research, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Dr. Hertha Kraus, Associate Professor of Social Economy and Social Research, Bryn Mawr College; Mr. Bruno Lasker, Research Associate, American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations; Dr. Frank Lorimer, Professor of Population Studies, American University; and Mr. Pickett.

Mr. Bertram Pickard wrote the report for the Sponsoring Committee. Author of an earlier report in NPA's series, *UNRRA: Gateway to Recovery*, Mr. Pickard has approached his subject with a depth of human understanding and practical knowledge of international affairs, born of many years of experience with international organizations, both private and public.

Our aim has been to present to the American public the most objective information now available on this difficult, but by no means insoluble problem.

E. J. COIL,
Executive Director.

September 9, 1944

EUROPE'S UPROOTED PEOPLE

THE RELOCATION OF DISPLACED POPULATION

Among the stupendous tasks of relief and rehabilitation that are facing statesmen and peoples as the conflict draws to a close, few, if any, are more urgent, or more complex, than that of relocating the multitude of persons uprooted by the tempest of war and revolution. The pain and disorientation experienced by these uprooted people go far beyond physical privation; they affect the minds, the emotions and the habits of millions, changing the course, not only of individual lives but that, perhaps, of society also.

This is no question of the free movement of people, or of organized migration to meet seasonal or other changing conditions. There is doubtless much to be said for migration in the ordinary sense of the term. The question of uprooted people is something quite different. The relocation of all these men and women will be a tremendous undertaking. It will call not only for human understanding in helping all these men and women to find again their rightful place as self-supporting and useful citizens but also for a statesmanship that will see this displacement as part of the wider problem of post-war organization—political, economic and cultural.

At the present time many things remain obscure. The size of the problem can only be guessed at; similarly the conditions under which relocation will take place are, in the main, matters for hypothesis and conjecture. Solutions cannot be put forward today as definite plans and projects. Nevertheless, in order that preparations for dealing with the problem may have the best chance of success, it is essential that the nature and extent of displacement should be envisaged as clearly as possible; also that lessons learned from past experience should be noted, in looking toward relocation.

This report, therefore, has a limited, but practical scope and purpose. It is (1) to present an over-all picture of the nature and extent of the problem, so far as Europe is concerned, at a time when public attention is being drawn to certain of the more spectacular and tragic aspects of displacement; and (2) to sketch the broad lines of possible solutions, including interim emergency measures.

Perhaps the most important part of the second task will be to seek to understand and to bring home the general conditions—

political, economic, cultural, and psychological—upon which adequate or durable remedies are dependent.

To keep the presentation within bounds, attention will be directed mainly to the specifically international aspects both of displacement and relocation, without wishing to minimize the importance—especially for some countries—of the problem of relocating persons who have been not only dislodged, but seriously uprooted, though within the national frontiers.

I. INTRODUCTION

The problem of displaced persons is important for several reasons. First of all, its scale is important. Taking into account all the categories of displacement in Europe (including major displacements within countries), a figure of from twenty to thirty million persons who have either been displaced or are likely to be displaced before the end of hostilities is commonly cited.

Secondly, the problem has importance as a symptom of a revolutionary period in human history. The past quarter of a century marks what may be either the descent to disaster or the threshold to a new age. Among the major causes of unprecedented displacement of population are interrelated technological and ideological factors. Scientific warfare, notably in the air, has obviously greatly increased both the premeditated and unpremeditated dispersal of people in modern war. Totalitarian concepts, ruthless toward human relationships, are the product of revolutionary political and social doctrines, as well as of the exigencies of modern techniques. While the calculated violence of the present rulers of Germany against certain peoples is without parallel, it would falsify the picture to pretend that the problem of displaced persons does not antedate the emergence of the Nazis. In fact, during the last quarter of a century the world has witnessed the uprooting and transplanting of peoples on an unprecedented scale.

In the third place, the consequences of displacement, whether for the individual, the family, or society, assume particular importance in a world where the obstacles to solution of the problem appear to have grown with the gravity of the problem itself.

OUTLOOK FOR RELOCATION

The outlook for relocation, as was the case in the inter-war period, depends upon the general outlook for recovery. Without a

reasonable degree of political security and economic stability, anything approximating complete relocation of displaced persons becomes impossible. Nevertheless, attempts at relocation cannot be postponed until political and economic settlements are achieved.

One authority on refugee problems, in an informal statement, has ventured a general prophecy as to what may happen, so far as Europe is concerned, taking into account, clearly, the passionate human desire to go home on the part of those long separated from their hearths and kin. He writes:

The initial mass repatriation after the fighting stops is likely to take care of the overwhelming majority of those now displaced in Europe. But the residue of internationally-displaced people there may number anything from one to five million, and will represent a tangle of social and political considerations which will tax all our ingenuity and conscience. Many of them can probably be repatriated over a period of years; many will need help in finding new homes overseas; perhaps the largest proportion will be accommodated indefinitely in the countries to which they have been transplanted.

The figure of even one million people unable to go back home may seem high; but it is only about the number who left Russia after the Revolution and the unsuccessful counter-revolutionary wars, and who never returned.

FUTURE DISPLACEMENTS

In addition to the numbers already displaced, it is possible that additional groups of people may be displaced on account of three factors. First: new frontiers may be drawn, in eastern Europe for example, as a result of which considerable populations, from their own point of view, would find themselves on the wrong side of the frontier. Second: ordered transfers of population may be carried out, for example, in East Prussia and Czechoslovakia.¹ Third: there may be internal political and social struggles of one kind or another in many countries. And to more usual forms of social conflict may be added bitter tension between those who collaborated with the

¹ According to Winifred N. Hadsel's Foreign Policy Report of August 1, 1943, "Can Europe's Refugees Find New Homes?", President Benes, in an interview appearing in the *New York Times* of Feb. 19, 1943, urged that "Europe should avail itself of the opportunity presented by defeat of Germany to take the drastic step of exchanging national minorities." He clearly had the Sudeten Germans in mind, and in this connection it is significant that in the Leith-Ross Committee's estimates of displaced persons the Czech figure included half a million expatriates—that is to say, Czechs living abroad—who inferentially were to be returned to the homeland.

Axis and those who did not, as well as between those who stayed within the occupied country and those who fled.

If these possibilities materialize, and if the principal United Nations should fail to achieve a reasonable degree of political and economic cooperation, then the suggested maximum figure of five million would not be as fantastic as it may at first sight appear.

But there is no need to assume the worst. On the contrary there is good reason to suppose, as one question after another is raised in conference among United Nations, that the common planning of war-time will be continued afterwards.

THREE-WAY RELOCATION

International cooperation will be essential in all the three ways by which displaced persons may find a home and work again—repatriation, absorption in the place of actual residence, or resettlement in a newly-adopted country.

It is assumed in the statement cited above that there will be an initial mass repatriation of displaced persons. This will almost certainly prove true. Nevertheless, there are a number of awkward factors to bear in mind. In a recent editorial the *Economist* declares that—"To go home is the first right of every uprooted European, but like many other elementary rights in itself it solves no real problems . . . Only when the great trek back is finished does the real problem begin."² Can the repatriates be supported when they get home? And will they be wanted? The answer to the first question is economic, dependent both upon personal and general factors. The answer to the second question may be a matter of politics, religion, or race.

It is suggested, furthermore, that probably the largest proportion of those who will not be repatriated at a relatively early stage will be absorbed, or at least accommodated, by the countries of actual residence. The number of persons absorbed will depend upon economic and ideological factors. With full employment and production, resulting from efficient reconversion and effective measures of agricultural and industrial reconstruction, the possibilities of absorption would proportionately increase, while the local population's opposition to newcomers would correspondingly decrease.

The ideological question is a painful one. It might be assumed that victorious nations, who have subscribed to doctrines of freedom and against discrimination on political, religious or racial grounds,

² The *Economist*, Dec. 4, 1943; p. 738.

would be eager to practice what they have preached. But there is plenty of evidence to raise serious doubts. Nobody questions, least of all the Jews themselves, that anti-Semitism, for example, will be a serious problem in relation to repatriation, absorption, or migration, whether by "infiltration" (i.e. movement of individuals) or by group resettlement.

The Jewish question, moreover, is by no means the only racial issue that will complicate attempts to place the protection of minorities upon a morally sound and politically practicable basis. Racial intolerance anywhere will react unfavorably upon the attempt to deal with the problem of Europe's displaced population, especially the refugees.

II. NATURE AND EXTENT OF DISPLACEMENT

There are degrees of displacement, all the way from minor movements to the most extreme forms of uprooting. The flights from the mobile battle fronts of modern war are remarkably extensive. The effects of manpower requirements and of the application of political or racial dogma are unexpected and incalculable. In the past a refugee was defined as a person who had left his country on account of persecution for political or religious beliefs or for racial origins, and who found himself deprived of national protection, in law or in fact. In the future there will be, in addition to refugees in the old sense, many other displaced persons who have been uprooted by the war, and who, for one or more of many possible reasons, are unable to return to their native country.

In discussing the nature and extent of displacement, figures alone are delusive, as they can be only the merest approximations in any case. Even so, they provide a rough and ready framework in which to set the facts.

SCALE OF DISPLACEMENT

When the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was inaugurated in November, 1943, with the responsibility, among other things, of making preparations and arrangements "for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes,"³ it found that two comprehensive studies of displaced persons in Europe had already been made. Though each was carried

³ See the Preamble to the UNRRA agreement; *UNRRA: Gateway to Recovery*, p. 63; National Planning Association; February 1944.

out independently, following different methods, their respective estimates covered substantially the same period and the same categories. They therefore provide an admirable basis for comparison and further research.

The Leith-Ross Estimates

The first of these studies was made in London under the auspices of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements (popularly styled the Leith-Ross Committee). The Committee's *Statistical Statement on the Problem of Displaced Persons* was prepared on the basis of information supplied by the various European Governments-in-Exile, together with supplementary facts and figures furnished by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The *Statement* was included in a memorandum furnished by the Leith-Ross Committee to the UNRRA Council meeting at Atlantic City, but was never issued publicly. However, a summary table was given to the press in London on November 10, 1943, the day the UNRRA Council assembled, and appeared in the United States the following day.⁴

The table produced here, which is based upon the Leith-Ross estimates, gives an indication of the size and extent of the problem of uprooted people in most European countries. The total of 12,425,067 is an estimate. It is made up of figures which are an approximate computation based upon partial and sporadic information difficult to come by. They may be much too high on account of the considerable drift back home that is known to have occurred in some cases. They may be much too low because of important new displacements that have taken or will take place.

The figure does not include the large internal displacements of population that have taken place in Soviet Russia at the time of the German attack, in Germany as the result of air bombardment, in Poland due to the German population policy, in Italy, and elsewhere. Nor does it include displaced persons now residing outside Europe. Moreover, it must be remembered that since then further displacements have been taking place daily all over the European continent.

The Kulischer Estimates

The second important study on displaced persons, perhaps the most comprehensive to date, was issued by the International Labor

⁴ *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1944.

ALLIED GOVERNMENTS' ESTIMATE OF HOMELESS OR DISPLACED PERSONS SCATTERED OVER EUROPE

<i>Country of Origin</i>	<i>Germany and Austria</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Russia</i>	<i>France and North Africa</i>	<i>Spain and Portugal</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Greece and Yugoslavia</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania</i>	<i>Total</i>
Baltic States ..	80,000	130,000	127,200	337,200
Belgium and Luxembourg.	677,000	126,000	3,500	28,300	2,050	120,000	836,850
Bulgaria	20,000	140,000
Czechoslovakia	831,000	200,000	3,600	25,000	250	650	30,000	2,600	109,000	1,202,100
Denmark	34,000	4,000	38,000
France	1,829,000	216,000	14,000	2,059,000
Germany	245,000	500,000	3,000	748,000
Greece	25,000	3,400	40,000	68,400
Hungary	27,000	17,000	44,000
Italy	414,500	90,000	1,000	505,500
Netherlands ..	529,500	150,000	2,000	53,000	200	734,700
Norway	3,000	1,200	17,000	21,200
Poland	2,450,000	692,000	16,500	620	130	500	3,100	39,050	3,201,900
Rumania	14,000	190,000	250,000	45,000	454,000
Russia	800,000	25,000	300,000	1,170,000
Spain	8,500	150,000	158,500
Yugoslavia ..	419,207	170,000	107,510	9,000	705,717
Grand totals	8,161,707	1,428,200	1,078,300	862,800	17,120	17,780	53,000	192,500	116,610	497,050	12,425,067*

Based upon estimates prepared in the spring of 1943, under the auspices of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements.

* This total does not include internal displacements in Russia, Poland, and elsewhere. Nor does it include the considerable number of Europe's displaced persons now resident outside Europe.

Office. It was prepared by Mr. Eugene M. Kulischer in consultation with the late Mr. Pierre Waelbroeck, former Chief of the I. L. O.'s Migration Section.⁵

The Kulischer and Leith-Ross estimates arrive at substantially the same total, though Mr. Kulischer includes a figure of some 10 million people who moved eastward inside Soviet territory at the time of the German assault. His total of 30 million is comparable, therefore, with the Leith-Ross total (including internal displacements) of 21.5 million. The difference between the figure of 21.5 million and that of 12.5 million as shown in the table is accounted for by the subtractions indicated above.

The Kulischer Report is much more than a Statistical Statement. Entering only tentatively into the problems of relocation, it does constitute as clear a factual analysis as exists of the major elements in displacement, and of their geographic incidence and sequence in time. It classifies and describes the displacements under two major categories: (1) Migration Movements of the German People; and (2) Movements of Non-German Populations. These movements are pictured, respectively and graphically, in three maps—two of which appear as a center spread in this pamphlet by courtesy of the I. L. O. The third map depicts the streams of non-German workers conducted into the Reich for purposes of war production—now some 8,500,000, perhaps, according to the latest estimates.

CHARACTER OF DISPLACEMENT

The character of displacement has a very direct bearing upon the whole problem of relocation.

There are many possible classifications of displaced persons, although none of them is wholly satisfactory, because definitions overlap and persons obviously pass from one group to another. Nevertheless, there are a dozen or so defined categories of displaced persons which have now become more or less standardized through general acceptance by those dealing with the problem. Many of them were in common use in the inter-war period. They have been used in Sir John Hope Simpson's monumental survey of the refugee problem,⁶ by the Leith-Ross Committee, and by UNRRA. There is much to be said, therefore, for employing them.

⁵ *The Displacement of Population in Europe*, by Eugene M. Kulischer; International Labour Office; Montreal, 1943.

⁶ *The Refugee Problem—Report of a Survey*, by Sir John Hope Simpson; Oxford University Press, 1939. (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.)

As a guide to clear thinking about, and imaginative picturing of, the problem of uprooted people, these generally accepted categories are arranged here in three broad groups which, by and large, cover the displacements as a whole. Although nothing in this phenomenon is really hard and fast, or fully separate, the displacements in general have taken place because of (1) the direct impact of military events; (2) the application of ideological policies; (3) the pressures of manpower requirements in total war.

(1) Impact of Modern War

The first category of persons to be dislocated by the impact of active hostilities are the *War Fugitives*.

Throughout all history the ebb and flow of battle has been accompanied by waves of civilians in flight, endangered in body and distraught in mind. But in a war where no town or village has been safe by day or night, and where mechanized might surges forward with devastating speed, the displacement of the war fugitive has become something new and terrible in both intensity and range.

An example of the range of persons fleeing war zones is found in the explosively scattering effect of the German blitz assault upon Poland. The countries to which Poles have dispersed, as reported by the Polish American Council, Inc., are Germany, Switzerland, Russia, Spain, Portugal, North Africa, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Sweden, the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, Nyasa, India. The illustration gives a distressing picture of long and arduous journeys in quest of refuge.

As to the intensity of the experience under modern conditions, there is no need to give specific examples: what happened at the time of the German attack upon the Low Countries and France in the summer of 1940 will not easily be forgotten.

Evacuees make up another major category involved in an organized flight from actual, or potential, hostilities. There have always been organized evacuations connected with warfare, but the bombing of cities and the defense of vast coast lines against possible invasion have revolutionized the situation.

A few concrete cases illustrate this point. In February of this year we learned that Czech districts were crowded with evacuees

from Bremen, Hamburg, Hanover and Brunswick. "They have to build their own camps," it was said.⁷ It was similarly reported that by order of the German military authorities French people along the Mediterranean coast were being evacuated northward, in some cases as far as Grenoble. "This second exodus," it was said, "is much like that of June 1940."⁸

Prisoners of War constitute another large element in the group directly affected by military events. Although they represent a more familiar problem, the fact that large numbers of prisoners of war have been deprived of their recognized conventional status and have been doing war work, under varying degrees of duress, poses a special problem. The fact that the rules and regulations, as defined by the Geneva Conventions, are not being applied between Germany and Russia is a complicating element in this part of the problem.

Another considerable category of war victims is that of *Civilian Internees*, that is to say the nationals of one belligerent who are detained by another belligerent for reasons of national security.

Finally, there are members of *Armed Forces*, including *Demobilized or Disbanded Men*, either Allied or Axis in origin, whose displacement constitutes a serious problem, as was well revealed both at the time of the collapse of France in 1940, and following the armistice with the Badoglio Government in Italy.

(2) Product of Ideological Policies

Foremost among the sufferers from ideological policies are the *Refugees*, defined as persons who for political, religious, or racial reasons are expatriated and so lack the legal protection of their own or any other country. They may be already beyond the reach of their persecutors, or they may have the double misfortune still to be interned in the land of their origin, or in a territory controlled by the persecuting government in which they may have resided before occupation. In that case they are *Civil Prisoners* as well as *Refugees*.

Strictly speaking, *Deportees* are persons who have been removed from their own district or country on a deportation order. But, as a matter of fact, the term is commonly used to describe all sorts of arbitrary removals of persons from one place to another, for all sorts of reasons.

The word is employed to describe the massive removal of German Jews to Poland (or of, say, Baltic Jews, or other middle class liberals

⁷ "News Flashes from Czechoslovakia Under Nazi Domination," Feb. 7, 1944.

⁸ *Free France*, Feb. 1, 1944.

formerly resident in the Baltic States, to Central or Eastern Russia). It is also used when, for example, recalcitrant Norwegians are deported to Germany; or when any persons, connected or unconnected with political resistance, are deported for purposes of labor, or to make room for transplanted Germans; or again when children, or young persons, are deported for purposes of indoctrination; or young women or girls are deported for purposes of prostitution.

Another category of this group are the forced or semi-voluntary German settlers planted on occupied or annexed lands. From one point of view these people are merely Germans residing abroad. But the fact that they are intruders on other people's land has led to their being specially classified as *Intruded Persons*.⁹

(3) Manpower Requirements

Protracted war on two fronts has obliged all kinds of manpower expedients. Some of these clearly run counter to original intentions—for example, the scale of organized foreign labor within Germany, now grown to proportions which imperil effective organization on account of the dangers of sabotage and revolt.¹⁰

The category of *Axis-Organized Workers*—persons from occupied territories set to work in Axis interest, in Germany, with or without their own consent—is not only a very large one, but also a very difficult one to deal with. Even supposing there are some who, for one reason or another, would prefer to remain where they were deported, the vast majority, forced away from the homeland to work under conditions which savor of forced labor at best, will be only too eager to return home.

There is a second, though relatively insignificant, category in this third group, namely that of the *Axis-Organized Soldiers* (forced, or semi-voluntary). If the "New Europe" had accepted Hitler's boasts and claims regarding his leadership, presumably men would have competed for service with, or in, the Axis forces. There is little evidence of such enthusiasm. But there are reports which suggest that a considerable number (perhaps 200,000) of non-Germans have been conscripted for the army;¹¹ furthermore, that this is still more the case in connection with the Nazi Security Police.¹²

⁹ See *UNRRA: Gateway to Recovery*; National Planning Association, p 51.

¹⁰ This fact is emphasized in an unpublished memorandum on "The Results of Total Mobilization in Germany," by Eugene Varga (head of the Institute for World Economics and World Politics, Moscow), writing in July 1943.

¹¹ Eugene Varga in the memorandum referred to in the previous Note.

¹² See article entitled "Himmler's Army a Motley Force"; *New York Times*, April 6, 1944.

III. INSTRUMENTS OF RELOCATION

A large number of persons have been displaced in a number of different ways. Some are in territories controlled by United Nations or in neutral countries and already can be accounted for. Others come into the picture as and when enemy occupied territory is liberated or conquered. Eventually, the whole question of relocating displaced persons will fall within the scope of United Nations arrangements, with such cooperation of the neutrals and of the defeated Axis countries as may be determined.

This relocation is in part a self-starting and self-continuing process. It is important to realize that a great deal will be done through the personal initiative of the displaced persons, by their families, their home communities, and by a host of private and public agencies of many kinds—social, economic, cultural, religious, philanthropic and so on. Obviously the Allied military authorities have a crucially important role to play from the moment of liberation.

Where internal relocation can be carried out by the authorities of the particular country concerned, in cooperation with the military, the presumption is that such authorities will be responsible. But for some countries internal arrangements will prove extremely difficult, either because of the scale on which displacements have taken place, or because of the catastrophic dislocation and impoverishment of the economic life of the people as a whole. In such cases outside help may very well be needed. It is already known that several countries are counting upon such assistance.

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

International operations of one kind or another obviously become indispensable when displacement has been across national frontiers. They might take a bilateral form where it is a case of exchanging displaced persons between two contiguous countries. But the displacements so often have been far-flung that there will be a frequent need for multilateral arrangements. Political circumstances, even more than geographic considerations, necessitate an international approach to the problem of relocation. And because a certain standardization of principles and procedures is essential, the advantage of having a widely representative international body generally responsible for the working out of repatriation policies and the coordination of operations is clear. UNRRA has been

given that general responsibility, and it is commonly conceded that the repatriation of displaced persons is among UNRRA's biggest and most urgent tasks. It is a task of coordination even more than of direct operations; it is the task of providing expert assistance, when requested, to military and civilian authorities alike.

Even under the most favorable circumstances, however, given the inevitable disorganization which must follow the Axis defeat, the process of mass repatriation will take some time. The question arises who will be responsible for the temporary care of those waiting to be repatriated? The answer, again, is UNRRA—at any rate, as and when an initial responsibility of the military authorities has been discharged.

There is also the need for taking care of the large numbers of people, refugees and others, who will never return to former homes. It has been agreed that, in principle, wherever UNRRA is functioning, UNRRA will have temporary responsibility for the physical care of such persons, but that so far as negotiations and arrangements regarding permanent resettlement of refugees are concerned, the Intergovernmental Committee of Refugees should have a particular responsibility. Some of these persons, however, will not be "refugees" in the commonly defined sense of the term. There would seem to be a gap in the agreements to date, therefore, which will need to be filled.

ROLE OF UNRRA

The scope of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration's activity in behalf of displaced persons, as envisaged by the UNRRA Council at Atlantic City, is described in the following unofficial summary.¹³

It is clear that UNRRA is expected to operate in liberated areas for the purpose of returning United Nations nationals to their countries of origin and, if requested to do so by the government concerned, to return to their homes persons displaced within their own country. It would appear also that UNRRA can operate in conquered territory to return United Nations nationals to their country of origin. UNRRA may operate in any areas to return United Nations nationals to liberated countries if their return is a matter of urgency and if

¹³ The summary is a hopeful paraphrase, prepared for administrative purposes, of paragraph 5 and parts of some other paragraphs of the Report on Policies with Respect to Assistance to Displaced Persons; see p. 156 of the Selected Documents of the First Session of the Council of the U.N.R.R.A. (U. S. Government Printing Office, 35c).

their displacement was caused by the war. UNRRA can also assist in the return of any nationals of the United Nations or stateless persons to countries of which they are not nationals if they have been driven from such places as a result of the war. Furthermore, UNRRA can assist in the repatriation of other types of persons who would normally fall within the scope of UNRRA's activities. It appears clear that UNRRA will not undertake the responsibility of returning prisoners-of-war unless specifically requested to do so by the governments concerned. At Atlantic City no definite policy was laid down for UNRRA for the return of enemy or ex-enemy nationals discovered in liberated territories or within the conquered territories themselves. This is a matter for later consideration by the Council of UNRRA.

The policies adopted regarding services to displaced persons determined to be its responsibility provide that UNRRA shall assure a unified system of identification records, health certificates, and preliminary identification papers for those in transit, and afford adequate shelter, maintenance and health provisions until they can be repatriated. UNRRA also assumes responsibility for the actual return of such displaced persons and for their care en route, as well as responsibility for ensuring that the proper food, clothing, housing and medical care are available to the time of their return to their homes. Such repatriation or return will be accomplished in accordance with priorities developed by negotiations with the governments concerned.

Beyond the specific policies laid down by UNRRA, it appears clear by the nature of its organization that the job of repatriation or return of displaced persons must be in accordance with plans developed in cooperation with representatives of the national governments involved. Due to the fact that UNRRA is likely to be operating in areas under the jurisdiction of military command, any plans for repatriation or return of displaced persons must be made with the approval of the military authorities so that full provisions for security will be made.

In order that we make full use of past experience and of all available resources in our effort to provide humane treatment and the eventual resettlement of uprooted persons, UNRRA policy directs that the work in conjunction with displaced persons be carried out in cooperation with such agencies as the International Red Cross, International Labour Office, and the Intergovernmental Committee, as well as with private voluntary agencies concerned with the same problem. In this regard conferences and discussions have gone on with the

several agencies mentioned and will continue in order that in the work of resettling displaced persons we may bring together and have the use of all available resources through the international agencies and the national governments concerned with this problem.

WORK OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

From its earliest days to the bitter end of the inter-war period, successive categories of refugees (Armenians, White Russians, Assyrians, refugees from Germany, Austria, the Saar, Spain, the Sudetenland) presented increasingly difficult problems, especially to countries contiguous to the sources of trouble and to harassed League of Nations delegates and officials.

Under constant pressure from the refugees and from many humanitarian organizations, and with exemplary leadership from large-hearted statesmen such as Dr. Nansen, the League was prevailed upon to establish more than one major organization, to undertake several special schemes of settlement, and last but not least, to provide the auspices for the negotiation of arrangements and agreements regarding the treatment of refugees, and especially of stateless persons.¹⁴

The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was established at a conference held in the summer of 1938 at the invitation of the United States at Evian on the French shore of Lake Geneva. The reason why the United States Government, independently of the League, should have convened this conference to consider plans for assisting political refugees, is easily explained. The United States was not in the League of Nations. The United States Government thought it might be able to do something in association with other governments, notably immigration countries, by way of negotiations with Germany "to improve the present conditions of exodus and to replace them by conditions of orderly migration."

The attempt which began with some hope, under the concerned leadership of Mr. Myron Taylor, who presided over the Evian Conference, was soon brought to little by the intransigence of the Nazi authorities, and presently to naught, or next to nothing, by the outbreak of war.

¹⁴ The history of international assistance to refugees is exhaustively treated in *The Refugee Problem*, notably in Chapter X.

The I.G.C. Reorganizes

The Anglo-American consultations on the refugee problem, which took place in the spring of 1943 in Bermuda, received a great deal of criticism. Nevertheless, the reorganization of the I.G.C. last August is one positive result of the Bermuda Conference.¹⁵ A Press Release of the I.G.C., dated October 14, 1943, describes this reorganization. At the first meeting of the Council of UNRRA, held at Atlantic City, it was assumed that the I.G.C. would be enabled to shoulder the indeterminate, but certainly heavy, burden of assisting the resettlement of unrepatriated refugees. A statement in the House of Commons on March 1, 1944, by Minister of State Richard K. Law, revealed that Great Britain and the United States had each agreed to underwrite £500,000 (i.e. £1,000,000, or \$4,000,000 in all) this year for the expenses of the I.G.C.¹⁶

Remembering how throughout the League experience governments encouraged private agencies to finance humanitarian work for refugees, this financial commitment for the I.G.C., as well as the funds being provided for UNRRA's activities, is a sign that the seriousness of the position is recognized even if, as yet, the means provided are incommensurate with the probable need.

The reorganization of the I.G.C. provides for a number of things. In the first place the membership of the Committee, formerly 28 states, has been increased by 10 and now includes Soviet Russia. It does not include China, as even now the Committee is limited to helping refugees from Europe. In the original terms of reference the I.G.C. was restricted to refugees from Germany and Austria and from the Sudeten areas. With the reorganization of the I.G.C. the mandate was extended "so as to include, as far as practicable, also those persons wherever they may be who, as a result of events in Europe, have had to leave, or may have to leave, their countries of residence, because of the danger to their lives or liberties on account of their race, religion or political beliefs."

¹⁵ See article "Refugees and Relief," by Patrick Murphy Malin, *Friends Intelligencer*, March 25, 1944, p. 200. Mr. Malin was himself appointed Vice-Director at the time of the I.G.C.'s reorganization in the fall of 1943. The Director of the I.G.C. is Sir Herbert Emerson, who combines this office with that of League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, his headquarters being in London.

¹⁶ *New York Times* of March 2, 1944, in which it was also reported, in the same dispatch, that £50,000 (\$200,000) had been approved forthwith, the grant for previous years being less than £2,000 (\$8,000).

Furthermore, whereas originally the I.G.C. was concerned exclusively in aiding certain categories of refugees to emigrate and settle, now it is authorized not only to maintain and transport these particular refugees, but to *preserve*, maintain and transport all refugees, in the regularly defined sense of the term, provided they become refugees due to "events in Europe." Preserve, presumably, has the same meaning as protect in the League connotation; and the I.G.C. is authorized to undertake, toward this end, negotiations with Neutral or Allied States.

UNRRA'S OTHER COLLABORATORS

UNRRA's policy directs, as we have seen, that the work for displaced persons "be carried out in cooperation with such agencies as the International Red Cross Committee, International Labour Office, and the Intergovernmental Committee, as well as with private voluntary agencies concerned with the same problem." The work of the Intergovernmental Committee has already been discussed.

The International Red Cross Committee

This remarkable Committee composed exclusively of Swiss citizens, with headquarters in Geneva, watches over the application of agreed rules of warfare, notably those concerning prisoners of war.¹⁷ Because of its unique sources of information about prison camps and war prisoners generally, it will play a leading consultative part in the repatriation of prisoners of war, in association with the military authorities and UNRRA, in so far as UNRRA is invited to cooperate by the governments concerned.

But the International Red Cross Committee will also play a vital part in helping to reunite scattered families whose dispersal spells one of the cruelest aspects of war and refugee displacements. To the Committee's deservedly famous card index of civilian internees, built up in Geneva with such patience and care, will be added the names of displaced persons after registration in the places where found. In this way it is hoped often to reestablish contact between persons who have lost all trace of one another, whose relocation would naturally be governed in no small measure by the place where a lost family member is discovered and the fate of kith and kin.

¹⁷ See *Prisoners of War—A Study in the Development of International Law*, by William E. S. Flory; American Council on Public Affairs; 1942.

The International Labor Organization

The I.L.O. is not an operating agency, so that neither in connection with an Employment Service nor with migration is the I.L.O. likely to take the field in the same sense that UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee do. Nevertheless, in matters both of employment and migration—of vital importance to displaced persons—the I.L.O. has pioneered for years in promoting the interest of workers. Moreover, as the recent International Labor Conference in Philadelphia showed, the I.L.O. has given much thought to the problem of displaced workers. A Recommendation of the Conference concerning Employment Organization outlines the general principles which, it is suggested, governments should take into account in connection with the repatriation of prisoners of war and other displaced persons.. Similarly, a Resolution is concerned with the care and rights of foreign workers in Axis countries, pending their repatriation.¹⁸

Role of Private Agencies

As Sir John Hope Simpson has pointed out, with commendation, in *The Refugee Problem* (p. 539), private agencies were called upon to carry a heavy burden of assistance to refugees in the inter-war period.

But though the quality of their contribution was often high, the coverage and continuity of their activities were severely limited by inadequate resources—so that the contribution of private agencies could, in the nature of things, be only supplementary—while major questions of juridical protection and intergovernmental negotiation lay largely outside the orbit of their direct influence.

If, today, the possibilities for private agencies are still further limited by the immensity of the tasks, that does not mean that their financial-responsibilities are at an end, still less that their services can be dispensed with.

Various Jewish organizations, notably the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), certain religious societies (for example the Quakers), as well as social agencies like the International Migration Service, for example, have a wealth of knowledge and experience, together with trained personnel. The wide range of that experience, and the readiness to apply it directly, or indirectly through affiliated or associated agencies in various parts of the world.

¹⁸ See I.L.O. *Official Bulletin*; 1 June 1944, Vol. XXVI, No. 1.

is illustrated by a recent memorandum, presented to UNRRA by the Committee on Displaced Persons of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service.

The eleven member agencies, which sponsored the memorandum, expressed their readiness to operate, directly or indirectly, a score of different services (Individualized Relief, Work Projects, Health and Children's Services, Hostels, Employment Service, Educational Programs, Counseling, Migration Service, Vocational Rehabilitation, and so on) in some forty countries situated in four continents, and including countries on both sides of the present battle fronts. Since the memorandum was presented, the number of member agencies has increased to twenty-one.

It is not surprising that UNRRA and the I.G.C. are taking active steps to bring these unofficial resources into coordinated relationship with official plans and activities.

IV. THE TASKS OF RELOCATION

Consideration of the tasks of relocation involves discussion of (1) interim measures; (2) repatriation aims and methods; (3) possibilities of absorption in the country of temporary residence; (4) avenues for resettlement elsewhere.

INTERIM MEASURES

Interim measures taken on behalf of uprooted people will be of two kinds: shorter-term measures designed first to meet an emergency, and second to cover needs pending repatriation; and longer-term measures, of indefinite duration, designed to give such extended help as is necessary pending final absorption or resettlement. These two series of measures overlap in time and place; they may be indistinguishable for a period; but they will become differentiated as the respective needs of prospective repatriates and resettlers are discovered.

From Improvisation to Coordination

Both kinds of measures are being taken today. Indeed they have been taken for some time past, as necessity arose, in the Middle East by the (British) Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA), now incorporated in UNRRA; in North Africa by the (United States) Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) now also absorbed in UNRRA; in Sicily and Italy by the Allied Military Government (AMG); in various places

by the I.G.C., the International Red Cross Committee, and by many private agencies, not least the Joint Distribution Committee.

As the war has progressed, with both liberated and Axis areas coming under United Nations control, the need for coordination of military, governmental and private action has grown; and UNRRA has become the focus of such coordination.

Some with first-hand knowledge of the field have envisaged a highly integrated form of organization. A somewhat looser form of organization is in fact arising. UNRRA, with a small planning staff in Washington¹⁹ and a larger staff in London for the European region, has established close working relations with the military authorities and with the European Governments-in-Exile. It seems likely that the military authorities will utilize UNRRA's technical services very early in the occupation of any territory; and it is UNRRA's intention, in line with general policy on relief and rehabilitation operations, to encourage national governments to do everything that they can arrange to do, jointly or severally.

The European governments previously associated with the Leith-Ross Committee have established an Inter-Allied Commission for Repatriation to coordinate their respective plans and efforts. But it seems likely, judging from the latest reports,²⁰ that this cooperation will be worked out as part of a general coordinated plan, approved by UNRRA's European Committee, and submitted in the form of a draft multilateral agreement to all the governments concerned, with good prospect of early signature by most of them. Private agencies, generally speaking, will come into the picture through association with one or more of UNRRA's functional Divisions. UNRRA's Health Service will participate actively in the work.

How things will work out in practice will depend upon military and political developments and on the situation in the area of Europe in question (East, South or West).

The problem in Germany undoubtedly will provide the greatest test regarding repatriation. The importance of concerting military with civil planning is nowhere more necessary, as was stressed in the NPA's earlier pamphlet dealing with UNRRA as a whole.²¹ It is satisfactory to know that a group of some fifteen persons repre-

¹⁹ Mr. Fred Hoehler, who directed OFRRO's operations in North Africa and then represented Governor Lehman in London for some considerable time, is now the Director of the Displaced Persons Division of UNRRA, in Washington.

²⁰ Article by John MacCormack, *N. Y. Times*, July 29, 1944.

²¹ *UNRRA: Gateway to Recovery*; Planning Pamphlets Nos. 30-31; p. 52.

senting UNRRA are already working with the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces, in London.²²

Shorter-Term Measures

The Anglo-American Combined Staffs have agreed that the military authorities, in conformity with their general responsibility for initial relief measures, will provide food, clothing, and medical aid to displaced persons at the outset of liberation, as well as be responsible for initial collection and classification of such persons in centers or camps.

It is the military authorities, not UNRRA,²³ who will issue and be responsible for the enforcement, if possible, of a "stand-still" order designed to prevent a general stampede homeward by any and every means available. Experience after the last war showed the dangers arising from failure to control the movement of people trying to go home, but also the difficulty of organizing such a control. A procedure has to be found which, while offering inducements to those who will accept ordered repatriation, does not fail to take account of probable large-scale spontaneous movement homeward.

PRE-REPATRIATION SERVICES—The main efforts will be to meet the needs for maintenance and medical care of those who accept the discipline of organized repatriation. They will be collected so far as practicable in centers (which may be a complex of billets of various kinds) or camps in which many displaced persons now reside. Either the military or UNRRA will arrange for initial registration of all displaced persons, including the issuing of an identity card of a standard kind which will presumably be endorsed, or modified, at the stage of formal identification and classification.

As for those persons who, regardless of injunctions, make for home perhaps by unfrequented ways through forests or over mountains, the intention is to waylay them at likely points of passage near national frontiers, with a view to protect the frontier against incursions of undesirable persons, or diseases. No one imagines that this will be easy.

Identification and classification in camps and centers will be made by nationals of the various countries concerned, working

²² Dispatch by Sonia Tamara, "UNRRA Plan of Resettlement Is Made Ready"; *New York Herald Tribune*, July 5, 1944.

²³ UNRRA, though styled an Administration, is in no sense a government and will never, presumably, be responsible for the administration of an area except with respect to particular services, in so far as it is invited to assume such charge, either by the military or civil authority, as the case may be.

under UNRRA's auspices, but perhaps loaned by governments. Repatriation priorities will be established when this identification has been made.

When once the emergency measures have been carried through, the amelioration of center and camp life for those waiting their turn to be repatriated will be a chief responsibility of repatriation officials. Material improvements must be made in the living conditions which in the case of existing internment camps will have been far from satisfactory. And the minds and spirits of those awaiting repatriation must be sustained through cultural and educational activities, for which private agencies with experience in such matters will be specially needed. Camps that were bad have been made better—in North Africa, in the Middle East, and elsewhere.²⁴ The Swiss organize model camps for their many internees.²⁵ The question of vocational training by way of preparation for repatriation will be important in proportion as delays in repatriation occur.

EMPLOYMENT SERVICE—The International Labor Office has suggested in some of its reports that the post-war re-employment problem in Europe would be considerably facilitated through a proper clearing system between the various national employment agencies. This proposal, which would amount in fact to the setting up of an Inter-European Employment Service, has a wider purpose than the re-employment of displaced persons. But the employment aspect of pre-repatriation measures for displaced persons is obviously of the greatest importance, for the persons themselves and for their country. A special branch of such an Inter-European Employment Service, with displaced persons in view, is clearly desirable.

Longer-Term Measures

Experience in the inter-war period—and there is no reason to think the future state of affairs will be any better—proves that the problem of an unplaceable residue of uprooted people is of long duration.

This residue, the size of which cannot be accurately computed, but which might easily run into hundreds of thousands for a

²⁴ UNRRA Press Release No. 52, June 9, 1944.

²⁵ For an account of what should be done, and how, see "Rehabilitating the Internee," by Curt Bondy; *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter, 1943; or for fuller treatment a longer article by the same author, entitled, "Problems of Internment Camps"; *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, October 1943.

generation, will be composed of some who are employable if only the positions can be found for them; others who are unemployable, either through age or infirmity; yet others for whom neither work nor settled residence can be found on account of statelessness, or other political considerations.

So far as the first group is concerned—those potentially employable—the solution lies along the line of vocational training and morale building in camps and centers through the acquisition of such skills as are most likely to open doors to employment. In addition, governments must continue, in cooperation with private agencies, to support and administer the requisite camps and centers.

Of the second group—those unemployable by reason of age or infirmity—some doubtless will wish and be able to rejoin families in the country of origin or elsewhere. But for others this may be quite impossible or only at a cost in personal sacrifice which should not be demanded in the circumstances. For such persons it has been suggested by Dr. Hertha Kraus that there should be established in suitable rural areas in Europe, the requisite number of sanctuaries, or sheltered large-scale residences, where, under international protection and administration, these most pathetic victims of uprooting should pass the remainder of their days in the care of men and women who would welcome the opportunity of ministering to them.

Parenthesis on Statelessness

Stateless persons create one of the most perplexing and difficult of refugee problems.

Before 1914 "statelessness" was a rare phenomenon, though it arose by accident or design in a number of ways. But, after World War I, denationalization and denaturalization became a favorite weapon of totalitarian states against their political opponents.

In 1922, an intergovernmental conference met with a view to agreement on the issue of an international document to the denationalized refugees from Russia.²⁶ This led to the creation of the deservedly famous "Nansen Passport," so valued by various categories of refugees in the inter-war period. But though the governments accorded travel facilities with relative ease, rights of residence and work were far more difficult to obtain.

²⁶ *The Refugee Problem*, p. 239. Although *The Refugee Problem* does not deal exhaustively with the problem of statelessness, it covers the ground in a general way in about 10 pages, from p. 231 on.

Although the Arrangements and Conventions concluded under League of Nations auspices, relative to the categories of refugees for which the League assumed responsibility, did something to meet the problem, a suggestion by Norway, in 1935, that there should be a general charter for refugees and stateless persons was not followed. This was because of economic and other fears—some well founded, others held quite unjustified by the advocates of refugees' rights.

Even among these proponents, opinion is not united. Some suggest that, in a general Charter of Human Rights, the United Nations should include a proscription against the practice of denationalization. Others think that would be unacceptable as a general principle, but that States might submit themselves to some form of impartial decision in the matter (say by the World Court), or at least should bind themselves not to put stateless persons over frontiers to the hurt of their neighbors. This practice of *refoulement*, as it is styled, has led to appalling cruelties, leaving individuals, and even considerable groups,²⁷ in an impasse from which suicide has seemed to provide the only logical escape.

Something must be done after the present war to regularize and humanize protective procedures, now vested in the League of Nations. But the nature of the protection will depend upon the size of the problem. If the number of stateless persons is small, the problem will be tractable; if the number is large, new methods of protecting and representing them may have to be invented. For example, some experts think that stateless persons should be accorded a special kind of status with defined rights and duties. Again, it is sometimes suggested that the function of representing stateless persons in negotiations with governments might conceivably be undertaken by a single government, or by some influential private agency, though, all things considered, the most likely agency would be some intergovernmental authority specially equipped for such a purpose—possibly the Intergovernmental Committee.

ASPECTS OF REPATRIATION

Although the policies agreed upon, and to be agreed upon, by the UNRRA Council are common policies, phrased in a common language, it does not follow that their application will always be similar. The practice of the various liberating armies of the United Nations, and of particular governments, may possibly vary.

²⁷ See *The Refugee Problem*, pp. 251-52, for examples.

NOTE: The arrows indicate the area of origin, the area of resettlement and the numerical importance of the various German minority groups transferred up to 1942 under agreements concluded between the Reich and the Governments concerned. For fuller explanations and for sources of figures, see chapter I, section I.



Prisoners of War

A number of governments show a disposition to use UNRRA instead of the military for repatriating prisoners of war, on account of the inextricable tangle of prisoners of war with Axis-organized labor. It is commonly assumed that the repatriation of prisoners of war is one of the relatively simpler tasks. But it will be a hard and painful task everywhere, especially in Eastern Europe. Not only the International Red Cross Committee but also the War Prisoners' Aid of the Y.M.C.A. has rendered inestimable service among war prisoners under the onerous conditions of total war. Their work will continue during the process of repatriation when it will be badly needed, especially in connection with unclaimed prisoners of war.

To and from Germany

It was pointed out that UNRRA's policy regarding *Intruded Persons* has not been finally decided. But in so far as it was discussed at Atlantic City, it was abundantly clear that particular governments were anxious to reserve to themselves the right to deal with this matter as they saw fit before there was any question of UNRRA's intervention.

A WORD OF WARNING—Even so, a sizable problem may remain, and there are certain dangers which objective observers note. Many of the intruded Germans who came, let us say, to Poland, or Alsace-Lorraine, from the Baltic States or the Bukovina, came reluctantly at best; and they will not be able to return to the areas from which they came. If without plan they are precipitated to Germany at the moment of her collapse—and especially if other Germans from East Prussia, the Sudetenland and elsewhere are sent packing to Germany, the problem of maintaining and arranging for the orderly repatriation of the forced laborers in Germany is going to be greatly increased, perhaps to the point of near-chaos. It is, therefore, to be hoped that the UNRRA Council and member governments will try to see the problem of movement to and from Germany as a whole.

TRANSPORTATION RIDDLES—A good many people have made calculations concerning the speed with which 8 to 10 million persons in Germany can be sent home by rail and road, though the

mathematics are not always easy to understand.²⁸ Clearly the question of priorities arises here; and even if, as is likely, the military authorities have a transportation plan worked out for Europe as a whole, the nature of Germany's defeat will greatly affect the problem of organization. Strictly military necessities, coupled with general relief and rehabilitation supplies, will place an immense strain upon what is left of the German transport system, which is the hub of the whole European system. So that the repatriation of the forced laborers in Germany may be delayed.

ECONOMIC CONUNDRUMS—The problem of maintaining the Axis-organized workers in Germany pending repatriation will be difficult from every point of view, including the economic. The International Labor Conference at Philadelphia gave considerable thought to this and while stressing the desirability of the speediest possible repatriation, suggested the general lines to be pursued by the competent occupying authority in connection with the employment of displaced persons in Germany so long as such employment were to continue.²⁹

But if continuing gainful employment in Germany for displaced persons is problematical, repatriation to fox-holes and no work in their own devastated lands would present another unpleasant problem. It will be essential to press forward industrial and agricultural rehabilitation speedily in the areas to which the workers will be returning. The I.L.O.'s suggestion for a European employment clearing service is much to the point. There is a certain danger of becoming hypnotized by the doctrine of repatriation for everybody, everywhere. For example, if France could usefully employ half a million Poles for a year or so, such a possibility should not be turned down on principle without consideration. The desirability of their eventual return to Poland, moreover, is a matter that might be left to work itself out. Naturally, the French and Polish Governments will have a decisive word to say.

²⁸ One such calculation appears in "Helping People To Help Themselves," p. 7; United Nations Information Office, New York City. Another is in the interesting article by Daniel Lang, entitled "The Queue on Vaclavske Square" (which despite appearances is about UNRRA), in *The New Yorker*, March 4, 1944.

²⁹ I.L.O. *Official Bulletin*; 1 June 1944, p. 100; Resolution VIII: See also Resolution XII (Annex I), p. 104, concerning "Protection of the Social Insurance Rights of Displaced Persons."

Jewish Hopes and Fears

The Jews have suffered exceptional wrongs both personal and economic so that, on the face of it, the return of the Jew to his home and work—if that be his wish—would seem the right and proper thing. But it is quite conceivable that in many instances the way will not be open to return. In a recent issue of *Jewish Comment* anxious reference is first made to the recent “desertions” of Jews in England from the Polish army, and subsequently to a recent statement by President Benes of Czechoslovakia to the effect that while in principle Jews should return to the country whence they were exiled, this should be arranged “on the basis of defined and unified principles binding all countries.”³⁰ Failing such an international administration of the question, he said, the repatriation of the Jews would be impossible. If the practice of the more liberal countries is to be made dependent upon the willingness of the less liberal, it is a disquieting prospect.

The attempt to protect minorities broke down in the inter-war period, in part because the new states in Eastern Europe which were obliged to agree to special obligations regarding protection refused to continue in that position unless all states signed similar commitments. The Big Powers were not ready to do so then. Would they be now?

POSSIBILITIES OF ABSORPTION

The residual group of refugees and other displaced persons in any given area of temporary residence will comprise (1) those who, though not citizens, have entered into the life of the country of adoption, and who are more or less well-received in the community; and (2) those who have the misfortune to be kept on sufferance with the tacit understanding that they must depart again at the first opportunity. The ratio between these two groups is not fixed. When economic conditions are good, the number of assimilable people goes up; whereas if unemployment is rife, the number of unwelcome persons rises. Changes in the political climate will act similarly.

But at this point it is the economic factor that must be stressed. The inter-war experience showed plainly enough that, given economic prosperity, the virtual absorption of several hundred thousand Russian refugees in France and elsewhere was not impossible. It was the economic crisis with consequent unemploy-

³⁰ *Jewish Comment*, Vol. II, No. 13, April 28, 1944; World Jewish Congress, New York.

ment that prevented this consummation. The key to the absorption, in the place of temporary residence, of displaced persons who, for one reason or another, will not be repatriated is to be found in a policy and program of full employment and high production. Such a policy, proposed to the International Labor Conference at Philadelphia, became that of the Conference as a whole.³¹ Moreover, it was given strong support by all three elements (Government, Employers, Workers) of the United States delegation.

Relative Responsibilities

There is another important factor connected with absorption which, though influenced by the general economic situation, is really a separate question. Throughout the period of the refugee problem there has been a measure of controversy as to whether the overseas countries like the British Commonwealth and the United States, which were able to exclude refugees if they wished, were bearing their fair share of the burden in comparison with countries which for reasons of geography became the chief receivers of refugees whether they liked it or not. It was pointed out, moreover, that the overseas countries were also the more privileged countries, in terms of resources and territories. Furthermore, they were often the countries that took the lead in initiating schemes and organizations designed to help the refugees, and so were expected to set an example of reception in their own borders.

One result of this controversy has been that the countries accommodating relatively large numbers of refugees tended to regulate their attitude both to the reception and possible absorption of refugees to the prospects of a proportionate effort on the part of immigration countries in general and the English-speaking countries in particular.

It is clear that the need to meet any legitimate anxieties of this kind has been constantly present in the minds of those people in the English-speaking countries who have labored to find solutions for the refugee problem. Whether more might have been done is a matter of opinion—an opinion to be formed, first of all, upon the facts and figures of the case.

³¹ Resolution VI concerning "economic policies for the attainment of social objectives"; I.L.O. *Official Bulletin*; 1 June 1944, Vol. XXVI, No. 1.

Refugees in U. S.

The number of refugees admitted to the United States during the past ten years (1933-43) has recently been a matter of some discussion if not dispute.

The figures which throw most light upon the situation were given by Mr. Earl J. Harrison, United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, at a meeting of the Refugee Relief Trustees, Inc., in New York on February 18, 1944.³² Having referred to the misunderstandings that had arisen as a result of the evidence given to the House Foreign Affairs Committee which, he said, had "been somewhat dissipated by subsequent explanation and correction," he gave the following analysis of the immigration figures:

The statistics, which are quite revealing, should quiet the fears of some alarmists who have the impression that we have admitted large numbers of refugees. First of all, let me explain that persons admitted into this country fall into one of two categories of the immigration laws; those who have been admitted for permanent stay are known as immigrant aliens; those who have come here for temporary stay only are classified as non-immigrant aliens. The latter category includes tourists, students, treaty merchantmen, and persons in transit. In the period between July 1, 1933, and June 30, 1943, we admitted for temporary stay 228,068 persons from countries which are now Axis dominated or Axis occupied.

279,091 persons from those same countries were admitted during the same period as immigrant aliens; that is, for permanent stay, in full accordance with immigration law. In other words, the total number of persons in both categories admitted from those European countries which are now under the Nazi thumb amounted to 507,159 . . .

Several estimates have been made as to the number of so-called refugees who have been admitted from Europe in the past ten years. Most of them seem to range between 200,000 and 300,000. On the basis of the figures I have mentioned, I would guess that such estimates were generally on the right track.

The following table is the breakdown of the total given by Mr. Harrison:

³² *New York Times*, February 19, 1944.

NUMBER OF IMMIGRANT AND NONIMMIGRANT ALIENS
(EXCLUSIVE OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND RE-
TURNING RESIDENT ALIENS) ADMITTED TO THE
UNITED STATES FROM AXIS-OCCUPIED OR AXIS-DOMI-
NATED COUNTRIES

Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 1934-1943

<i>Country of Birth</i>		<i>Country of Birth</i>	
Belgium	11,103	Italy	65,693
Bulgaria	1,349	Latvia	2,359
Czechoslovakia	23,276	Lithuania	4,754
Denmark	11,637	Netherlands	21,382
Estonia	1,035	Norway	18,698
France	39,309	Poland	50,101
Germany and Austria.....	214,500	Rumania	9,811
Greece	10,212	Yugoslavia	8,655
Hungary	13,285		
		Total	507,159

From Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service
Monthly Review for February 1944, page 4.

Accordingly, it appears that out of some 500,000 persons admitted to the U. S. in the last decade from European countries now under Nazi domination, about 250,000 were refugees. There are no authoritative figures regarding the proportion of these holding visitors' visas, but there are good grounds for thinking that they may be in the neighborhood of from 15,000 to 25,000. Hence the great majority of refugees arriving in this country in recent years may be said to have been absorbed already.

"FREE ZONES"—For some time past references have appeared in the press as to the possibility of a certain number of refugees being brought to this country and given temporary refuge here in so-called "Free Zones", or "Free Ports."³³ On June 9, 1944, the White House released the text of a cable from President Roosevelt to Ambassador Robert Murphy in Algiers of which the following is an extract:

. . . it is important that the United States indicate that it is ready to share the burden of caring for refugees during the war. Accordingly, I have decided that approximately 1000 refugees should be immediately brought from Italy to this country, to be placed in an Emergency Refugee Shelter to be

³³ On April 5, 1944, 982 refugees—men, women and children—arrived at Fort Ontario Emergency Refugee Shelter. (See *N. Y. Times*, August 7, 1944.)

established at Fort Ontario near Oswego, New York, where under appropriate security restrictions they will remain for the duration of the war. These refugees will be brought into this country outside the regular immigration procedures just as civilian internees from Latin American countries and prisoners of war have been brought here. The Emergency Refugee Shelter will be well equipped to take good care of these people. It is contemplated that at the end of the war, they will be returned to their homelands.

This action, as was made clear by the President in a message to Congress a few days later,³⁴ was taken in connection with the activities of the War Refugee Board.³⁵ Fuller details concerning the WRB are not included in this report, in part because it is a national rather than an international agency, but chiefly because it is of an emergency and transitory character, designed for rescuing threatened persons from Axis-controlled areas, and not designed for dealing with the post-war relocation of displaced persons.

Refugees in Britain

The position regarding refugees in Britain has been admirably analyzed by PEP (Political and Economic Planning) in its broadsheet *Planning* of January 14, 1944.

It states frankly that "a relatively smaller number of refugees was admitted to Britain after 1933 than to France, Holland or the United States."³⁶ The number of refugees in Great Britain at the outbreak of the present war "could not have been more than 90,000,"

³⁴ Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1944.

³⁵ By Executive Order, in January 1944, the President created a War Refugee Board consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of War. The purpose of the WRB is "to take all measures within its [the Government's] power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death, and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war."

³⁶ As one means of judging the relative responsibilities for the temporary accommodation given to refugees the estimates for various neutral countries are significant. According to Sir Herbert Emerson, as reported in the *Washington Post* of April 9, 1944, "Switzerland was giving asylum to 80,000 refugees, Sweden about 30,000." The Swiss total is only placed at 61,000 by the Joint Distribution Committee's *Digest* of January 1944. The Swedish figure, according to *News from Sweden* (Release No. 160), was 44,000 odd on January 1, 1944, to which total has to be added the Finnish children whose number had reached 25,000 by March 1944.

it is stated, and in 1943 the number of civilian refugees had risen to approximately 140,000.

Estimating that the number who will want to remain in Britain will be roughly 40,000, PEP deduces "that it should be possible to absorb the numbers in question without difficulty," and that "If Britain enjoys full employment after the war . . . there should be no refugee problem as we knew it before the war. In this case we should need all the labour that could be found. Moreover, past experience has shown that refugees actually created employment. They are likely to have the same effect after the war, especially in connection with our efforts to regain and expand our foreign trade." This optimistic forecast reflects Britain's fortunate position in being able to pick and choose among the refugees—a privilege shared by this country.

Absorptions Elsewhere

Many countries—throughout the British Commonwealth and Empire, in Latin America, as well as in Europe—will have an opportunity of contributing to the relocation of the residual group of displaced persons by absorbing varying numbers of refugees and others temporarily resident in their territories.

It is not practicable here to examine all the possibilities. But before passing to questions of resettlement, a word must be said about the outlook for absorption in Soviet Russia and in France.

In the case of the *Soviet Union* the very question as to what would constitute absorption is a matter of controversy. Mr. Kulischer estimates that 12 million people were displaced in Russia during the period of the German advance. Some 10 million were displaced within the Soviet frontiers of 1941; about 2 million were war fugitives, mostly from Poland. Among the former figure are many who disclaim Russian nationality but who, generally speaking, are claimed by the Soviet Union as citizens. Whatever the rights or wrongs may be, these people seem destined to be absorbed. It appears to be part of Russian policy to augment its manpower by keeping them.³⁷

There may be some latitude allowed for Poles, and reason to think that Poles originating from territories not occupied by Russia in 1941 will be given the option of returning to Poland.

³⁷ See "Jewish Post-War Problems—A Study Course" (Unit VII—Relief, Reconstruction and Migration), p. 31; The American Jewish Committee. Also the F.P.A. Report of Aug. 1, 1943, already referred to, p. 115.

France has generally been regarded in the past as the country of temporary residence and refuge *par excellence*. French policy toward refugees—first to the Russians and then the Germans—despite the fact that the latter are not easily assimilable in France, is to her redounding credit. But it is hard to prophesy about France's future and the sort of national policies she will pursue in a period of vicissitudes and passionate search for renaissance.

Population prospects being what they are, the opportunity for work by foreigners will probably in due course be great. Some think it will be so great that Italians, Spaniards and Poles, at least, will be welcome in large numbers. But national feeling might oppose such a development. And the economic situation in the early days following liberation may be difficult. It seems unlikely, on the face of it, that France will eject those refugees who are found on French soil at the time of liberation; but, admittedly, that is only a guess.

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES

The outlook for migration as a whole need not be fully discussed here. This report concerns the problem of immigrant refugees and other uprooted people, especially those who can neither be repatriated nor absorbed—a problem with pronounced characteristics of its own. It is, nevertheless, a problem that is conditioned to a considerable extent by the factors controlling migration possibilities in general.

Current Attitudes to Migration

A phase of most people's thinking is still influenced by the Golden Age of free migration when the free movement of men across political frontiers seemed part and parcel of a happy dispensation which governed similarly the free movement of goods and capital, and led to prosperity.

This influence sometimes persists in an advocacy of what are styled optimum possibilities,³⁸ that is to say the maximum conjunction of manpower and resources, with little regard to racial,

³⁸ For example, "New Factors in Migration and Settlement," by Imre Ferenczi, in *Regionalism and World Organization*; American Council on Public Affairs; 1944.

national, or other human factors. It persists also in an emphasis upon "rights" of migration.³⁹

ECONOMIC DOUBTS—At times our thinking is under the sway of a contrary idea, namely that prosperity can best be preserved by keeping out the immigrant. The "right" to move freely about the world is not an idea that is shared, let us say, by organized labor in this country.⁴⁰

The attitude of organized labor is only a reflection of a general fear in countries with a high standard of living that their standards would be endangered by too free immigration, notably in times of depression and unemployment.

Whether new immigrants necessarily represent such a danger is a question with many facets. "The answer," according to *The Refugee Problem* (p. 606) "must depend partly upon the particular industrial aptitude of the immigrants and partly on the economic circumstances prevailing at the time in the country to which they go."⁴¹ Certainly in I.L.O. circles, judging from the terms of the Resolution adopted at Philadelphia, facilities for migration for employment and settlement, subject to "adequate safeguards for all concerned," are deemed indispensable for the attainment of full employment and "the development of a dynamic [world] economy."⁴²

Whatever the answer may be regarding immigrants in general, and however favorable the economic results of the admission of certain types of refugees may have proved, it remains true that great masses of shattered and impoverished refugees present a special economic problem which has to be seriously faced.

POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES—If economic doubts on the part of the reception countries dog the steps of the refugee in search of settlement, political difficulties of many kinds are encountered along the way.

The admission of political refugees has always involved a risk that hostility to the exiles will be visited upon the country of refuge.

³⁹ A very strong statement in favor of the general principle of free migration is to be found in "Jewish Migration," by Eugene M. Kulischer; The American Jewish Committee; pp. 43-4.

⁴⁰ See article "Labor Looks at Migration," by Mark Starr (Educational Director, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union) in *Current History*, December 1943.

⁴¹ See also *Economics of the Refugee Problem*, by D. F. Buxton, with Introduction by Sir Norman Angell; Focus Publishing Co.; 1939; 46 pp.

⁴² Resolution VI, I.L.O. Philadelphia Conference; *Official Bulletin*, p. 96.

But when political and other refugees become so numerous the problem is different not only in degree but in kind. Size is not the only difference. The ideological controversies that today are conducted across national frontiers have no exact precedent in history. The effects are complex.

On the one hand, strong ideological sympathies between the refugees and some elements of the public in the reception country lead to an alliance in political warfare that may easily strain relations between two countries. On the other, extreme national or social doctrines have created a "fifth column" and "Quisling" problem little dreamed of until the present war. While the end of the war will not lay to rest fears of this problem—and, by and large, those fears militate against the easy acceptance of refugees—the very strength of the ideological affinities across national frontiers in many cases does facilitate the acceptance of refugees. The generous attitude of the Mexican Government to the Spanish Republican refugees is a case in point.⁴³

Resultant Opportunities

It is not possible within the limited space available here to survey the world and tabulate the possible openings for refugee immigrants. Such a survey could have little meaning until it is known how far such good resolutions as have been taken by the United Nations to work together politically and economically will be implemented. We do not know whether, as some think, the pressure toward migration will be very strong or, as others believe, the demand for labor will be so great that regulations against emigration will be the order of the day.

Probably the pressures will be different in different parts of the world, and within continents. This only emphasizes the great importance of bringing the kind of Employment Service suggested by the International Labor Office into existence as soon as possible, and seeing to it that one function of such a service will be to pay special attention to the employment possibilities for uprooted people. At the First Inter-American Population Congress, held in Mexico in October, 1943, emphasis on the selective principle was very marked, in considering the organization of migration in relation to post-war reconstruction. This implies that present thought is not moving back again to any open-door doctrine.

⁴³ See Special Section of the *Survey Graphic*, Nov. 1940, p. 588; also dispatch from Algiers in *New York Times*, April 6, 1943.

An unprecedented and highly significant development, which may yet further restrict migration possibilities for the residual group of displaced persons, is the decision taken at the Brazzaville Conference of French African Governors (Jan. 30-Feb. 8, 1944) to consider the adoption of "restrictive immigration regulations, directed at undesirable Europeans, in order to protect native labor from undue European competition."⁴⁴

Aids to Refugee Migrants

There could be some mitigation of the disadvantages which naturally accrue to the displaced, among which might be the following four.

Firstly, administrative and technical reforms and revisions within the frame of existing immigration laws and regulations could speed up both the process of acceptance and naturalization, at the same time lightening the burden borne by applicants and those acting for them.

Secondly, more might be done by strengthening the organization of financial backing for refugee immigrants, to reduce the crippling handicap that extreme poverty and lack of sponsorship entail.

Thirdly, training and retraining schemes will prove indispensable for many whose whole chance of competing successfully for limited openings depends upon being able to pass those selective tests which generally speaking are going to be applied. Such schemes are already undertaken on a considerable scale, notably by the Jewish organizations.

Lastly, cultural and individual adjustment, or reorientation towards new goals could take place. The problems of uprooted people are far from being just material matters of money and skills, important though these are. In many cases, uprooting has acted like a refining fire so that strong characters have become stronger, or seemingly ordinary people have grown into unusual personalities. But, perhaps, for most of those who have undergone the experience of final severance from so much that was part of them—home, family, friends, work and cultural ties—the result has been in part, at best, a disintegration of personality and a degeneration of values and standards of behavior.

It is of great importance to face this fact and its consequences. The need for medical and mental help will be great, but there will

⁴⁴ Department of State *Bulletin*, March 11, 1944.

be need for something more—the outpouring of human care without measure or stint, and with no nice calculation of benefits to accrue.

GROUP RESETTLEMENT

It is not part of the purpose of this report to discuss group resettlement in general, but to consider, strictly, the possibilities of schemes of collective refugee settlement. Nevertheless, certain general observations put the question of refugee resettlement in perspective.

Determining Factors

Although there are optimists who see deserts blossoming like the rose, most authorities would well understand Mussolini's querulous complaint that he was tired of being a collector of deserts. With the author of "The Myth of Open Spaces,"⁴⁵ they appear to agree that "It is a common fallacy to assume that space means opportunity." Or again, that "The main currents of population in our time flow towards and not away from thickly populated areas." In this last connection, however, the tendency toward decentralization, due to rapid transportation, and necessitated by total war, must not be lost sight of.

"The broadest conclusion," W. D. Forsyth writes, "that emerges from the study is that the nations can no longer hope to solve or even much alleviate their difficulties by shifting people about the globe." It is the same general conclusion that emerges from the classic survey of the possibilities in *Limits of Land Settlement*.⁴⁶ In his Introduction, Isaiah Bowman, the editor, states that—"Most of the pioneer lands that remain are 'marginal' in climate, fertility and transport." And Carl O. Sauer, in his contribution to the symposium, declares that all thinly populated lands "with two principal exceptions . . . are areas of unsolved climatic problems." These exceptions, he explains, are South America and Inner Asia, which is now in rapid transformation, in the main under Soviet initiative.

It must always be remembered, however, that revolutionary developments in the application of science may change the premises upon which contemporary judgments are based. For example, the

⁴⁵ "The Myth of Open Spaces," by W. D. Forsyth; Melbourne University Press, 1942.

⁴⁶ *Limits of Land Settlement* (a Report on Present-Day Possibilities) prepared under the direction of Isaiah Bowman; Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1937.

large-scale utilization of water power introduces a new and promising factor. The proposal for tapping the Mediterranean in favor of the Valley of the Jordan, if feasible, does change the whole Palestinian picture. The TVA experience in improving living conditions and opening the way for larger populations suggests a world-wide development of enormous possibilities.⁴⁷

ENCLAVES NOT DESIRED—There is a second major determining factor. Brazil, for example, is potentially one of the richest countries in the world and capable of supporting a vast population. Yet Brazil does not open her doors wide because—like every other country—she is afraid for political and cultural reasons to permit large homogeneous land settlements, amounting to enclaves, within the State.

Whatever the ultimate rights and wrongs may be, the opposition is clear and definite. It extends, generally speaking, to a homogeneous group of any size, that because of its homogeneity is likely to prove unassimilable in the general life of the country concerned. The bearing of this upon the group resettlement of uprooted people is clear. "The notion of group settlement on the land is attractive to refugees, because they hope to have the mutual support of their fellow refugees and to retain their own culture and traditions. These aspirations," affirms Sir John Hope Simpson, "are questionably desirable and their fulfilment is not often feasible." This is something of which to take account in any projected group resettlement plan; it constitutes, moreover, a reason for promoting assimilation in the wider community in cases where such enclaves already exist.

A "MARGINAL" COMMENT—Obviously, any resettlement in marginal areas where climate, fertility and transportation are defective, will cost more in wealth and health than anywhere else. And wealth and health are precisely what uprooted people have not. That is why some of the offers of land for such purpose in the past have smacked of a certain political cynicism, or even of a willingness to exploit already defenseless people under the guise of generosity.

⁴⁷ The following publications illustrate the point:

"Multiple Purpose Rivers," by Morris L. Cooke. Reprint from the *Journal of the Franklin Institute*, April 1944; pp. 353-4.

Palestine, Land of Promise, by Walter C. Lowdermilk. Harper, 236 pp., 1944.

TVA—Democracy on the March, by David E. Lilienthal. Harper, 248 pp., 1944.

Precisely the contrary motivation should apply. That is to say, the very need to embark upon schemes for the benefit of those with inherent handicaps should prove an incentive to exploit to the full modern techniques and the fertility of inventive minds in the service of frustrated hearts and hands.⁴⁸

The conclusion is obvious. If group resettlement in "marginal" areas is to be of any help in relocating uprooted people, a combination of three things is needed: (1) financial backing that will not expect normal dividends from the venture; (2) business acumen that will see that the investment of capital is not wholly disproportionate to the material results; (3) gifted leadership toward self-direction and independence; (4) and most important, a sane but enduring conviction that the moral gains will offset small material returns, or possibly even material losses of a measurable kind.

Past Success and Failure

Past experiments in the field of group resettlement of refugees include, for example: (1) those carried out under the general auspices of the League of Nations; (2) the establishment of refugees in Palestine; and (3) a series of smaller organized settlements, or projects, promoted by Jewish and other organizations.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS SETTLEMENTS—In reviewing resettlement achievements, Sir John Hope Simpson writes as follows:

The only large-scale schemes for group settlement of refugees, as distinct from infiltration movements, were rendered possible by the existence of exceptional conditions. These were the Bulgarian and Greek settlements, the settlement of returning Turks in Turkey, of Armenians in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia (Erivan), in Syria and the Lebanon, and of Assyrians on the Khabur River in Syria. There were important factors facilitating absorption.⁴⁹

What Lord Curzon once characterized as "the unmixing of populations" between Greece and Turkey, and which was achieved soon after the last war by the exchange of some million and a half Greeks against half a million Turks, was facilitated by several factors. National feeling in both countries favored the reception of the new populations. Suitable land in Greece was available and the incoming settlers possessed the skills needed, in the main. Moreover, the League of Nations was at hand to supervise the whole

⁴⁸ *Brazil on the March*, by Morris L. Cooke. McGraw-Hill, 297 pp. 1944.

⁴⁹ *The Refugee Problem*, p. 533.

proceeding and to promote the necessary loans. But, although this Greco-Turkish exchange deservedly ranks among the achievements of inter-war statesmanship, and of the League of Nations, it should never be forgotten that political appeasement was gained only at a very heavy price. This price was not only financial but involved a degree of human suffering that is described as "infinite misery" in Sir John Hope Simpson's sober record.⁵⁰

The Bulgarian Settlement of some 200,000 people was relatively less successful, on account of some political opposition in Bulgaria and the absence of vacant lands. Nevertheless, in 1939 Sir John Hope Simpson concluded that the "refugees may be looked upon as an integral part of the Bulgarian population, enjoying conditions similar to those of other Bulgarian peasants and workers."⁵¹

As for the Assyrian Christians from Iraq whose stormy odyssey after the last war was a painful preoccupation at Geneva in the 1930's, the settlement of a substantial remnant was at last achieved in 1937, on a self-supporting basis, in Syria on the Khabur River.⁵²

SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE—The only justification for this all too brief reference to the controversial question of Jewish settlement in Palestine is the fact that one or two major lessons regarding relocation of uprooted people may be learned from even a superficial study of the facts.

If the policy of the British White Paper now in force is carried out, Jewish immigration into Palestine is indefinitely suspended, as from March 31, 1944, except with regard to some 25,000 places, belonging to previously permitted quotas, yet unfilled. Clearly this gives time for reconsideration of policy before doors are finally shut and bolted; so that it would be premature to assume that this, in many ways the most hopeful and attractive, outlet for Jewish refugees has been stopped. Indeed, on the face of it, events, and opinions in high places, being what they are, it would be surprising if the policy on immigration were not revised.

Two things about the Palestine experience stand out prominently, and are of first-class significance for the question of settling uprooted people. The first is the heavy scale of capital investment

⁵⁰ *The Refugee Problem*, p. 22.

⁵¹ *The Refugee Problem*, p. 25.

⁵² See *International Relief in Action (1914-1943)*, by Hertha Kraus; The Herald Press, Scottdale, Pa.; pp. 196-200.

which puts it in a different category from any other colonization scheme attempted for refugees or other migrants.⁵³

This first factor of a financial nature springs from a second which explains it. The fact that a small country "devoid of obvious natural resources has become for a large section of the refugee community one of the most important areas of refugee settlement in the world," is due, Sir John Hope Simpson suggests, to "the religious enthusiasm of the Jewish race and to their genius for development."

The same idea is expressed, in other words, by Bruno Lasker as follows:

Among the many lessons which the recent experience of Palestine has to teach those who are trying to provide new homes for Europe's exiles in other parts of the world, the most important probably is that there has to be a bond of social idealism before other helpful factors can become fully effective.⁵⁴

The late Justice Brandeis, just before his death, gave inspiring testimony to the fact that the Palestine immigrants, time and time again, sacrificed their own hard-earned and only relative comforts in favor of new arrivals even less fortunate than themselves.

This element should be kept constantly in mind as the total or relative failure of so many other schemes is noted.

OTHER RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS AND PROJECTS—There have been during the past quarter of a century a considerable number of refugee resettlement experiments of varying success, or projects some of which may still be realized in whole or part.

They are too numerous to describe here, so that it is proposed merely to refer the reader to a number of books, reports, pamphlets or articles which together pretty well cover a field that still awaits systematic description and discussion. These resettlement experiments and projects relate to many parts of the world—notably, Latin America, but also to Canada, Australia, as well as various parts of the African and Asiatic continents, including the Soviet Union.

References to some of the earlier experiments are contained in *The Refugee Problem*. The "Sosua" experiment in the Dominican Republic which grew out of the Evian Conference is elaborately

⁵³ *The Refugee Problem*, p. 439.

⁵⁴ Article in the Special Section of the *Survey Graphic*, Nov. 1940, p. 585.

examined in *Refugee Settlement in the Dominican Republic*, prepared under the auspices of the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. A section of Hertha Kraus' recent book, referred to in Note 50, is devoted to group resettlement.

General surveys are contained, for example, in Winifred N. Had- sel's Foreign Policy Report (see Note 2); also in Bruno Lasker's article, "An Atlas of Hope," appearing in the *Survey Graphic* (see Note 52).

Among the publications dealing specifically with the problems of Jewish resettlement the following two may be mentioned: (1) Vol. 1, No. 4 (Nov. 1941) of *Jewish Affairs*⁵⁵ which contains descriptions of thirteen "Projects for Jewish Mass Colonization," most of which are still unrealized; (2) "Jewish Migration," by Eugene M. Kulischer, the American Jewish Committee, New York City.

Future Enterprise

Turning now to the future, what conclusions should be drawn in the light of past experience?

THE ECONOMICS OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT—Since group settlement will generally be in "marginal" areas, plans must take into consideration the quantity and quality of people to be settled. Such schemes cannot be profit-making enterprises in the ordinary sense of the term, and private resources would be inadequate for the purpose.

According to Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees under the League of Nations and Director of the Inter-governmental Committee, the total funds raised from private sources for refugees, between 1933 and 1939, were 50 million dollars in cash and 25 million in hospitality and other means of assistance. This whole amount it has been estimated "would have financed settlement of but 20,000 people, or only about 4 per cent of the estimated number to be evacuated from Greater Germany and emigration ports just prior to the war."⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Published by The Institute of Jewish Affairs, 330 W. 42nd St., New York, N. Y.

⁵⁶ *Refugee Settlement in the Dominican Republic*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., pp. 34-35, from which book this further passage may be cited: "To resettle and re-establish substantial numbers of impoverished people will require large sums of money. The prewar cost of settling 500,000 persons abroad was placed somewhere near 2 billion dollars, or almost \$4,000 per settler. Estimated per capita costs of settling limited numbers of refugees in the Argentine

Obviously public funds will be necessary; and judging from the contribution of public funds to UNRRA and the I.G.C., the United States and British Governments have already decided that relief and rehabilitation (including the care of uprooted people) represents a national interest as well as an international necessity. The question as to how much money will be forthcoming will be answered in accordance with the urgency of the problem and the soundness of the schemes proposed. The question also arises as to what agencies will be serviceable in preparing the ground for re-settlement projects.

Clearly the I.L.O. should be specially considered. Throughout the inter-war period it was dealing with migration questions generally, but from 1936 to 1940 it had also gone a long way to inaugurate machinery specially devised to pave the way for settlement schemes. A conference, held in 1938, of ten European emigration countries and eight Latin American immigration countries, led to the conclusion that lack of financial resources on the part of both the emigration and immigration country was often the only obstacle to orderly and desirable migration. What was needed, in short, was to bring together not only the countries of emigration and immigration but a third party, able and willing to play the role of banker. Toward this end, and with strong support from Latin American countries, the Governing Body of the I.L.O. decided to set up a Permanent Committee on Migration for Settlement, which was to have met in Geneva on July 4, 1940. It never met, for obvious reasons. But the project—a subject of discussion in Philadelphia ⁵⁷—has by no means been abandoned.

(Continued from page 42)

and in Rhodesia exceed this figure. Palestine costs range from \$2,500 to \$6,000 per settler. The Sosua project in the Dominican Republic contemplates a repayment by those settled there of \$1,600 per settler, although actual costs to date are undoubtedly at a rate considerably in excess of that figure. Estimates made just prior to the war of numbers to be evacuated from Greater Germany alone, including re-evacuation of emigrants still in Europe or the ports, total about 500,000 persons. The amount thus involved spread over a period of time may reasonably total not less than 1 to 1½ billion dollars. (pp. 19-20)

⁵⁷ At the Governing Body meeting following the Philadelphia Conference the decision was taken to "broaden the scope (of the Permanent Committee on Migration for Settlement) to cover all kinds of migration including the migration of industrial workers. This change in scope entailed changing the name to Permanent Migration Committee. The Governing Body authorized the Office to convene the Committee as soon as circumstances permitted, in order to exchange views on post-war migration prospects, to study the forms of international co-operation capable of facilitating an organized resumption of migration movement after the war; and to consider the problem of racial discrimination in connection with migration." (See *International Labour Review*, July 1944, p. 80.)

In October, 1943, the International Labor Office presented a memorandum to the First Inter-American Population Congress, meeting in Mexico City. The case for a permanent international migration organization after the war was strongly urged. The question of migration for settlement of displaced persons presents special problems; but, clearly, there is a close connection between the two questions. It is clear that the I.L.O. has expert knowledge and tried experience in this field which should be utilized to the full at the right moment.

It has also been suggested that "one of the activities of the proposed World Bank should be to underwrite approved schemes of migration."⁵⁸ The United Nations monetary conference held at Bretton Woods, N. H., from July 1 to 22, may have brought such a proposal within the bounds of practical politics.⁵⁹

Whatever the means, the upshot will be the same. Public money will have to be spent with the certain knowledge of a very limited yield, if not an actual loss. Nevertheless, it will be in the public interest to spend it for reasons of political and social and thus, indirectly, economic stability.

ETHICAL SINE QUA NON—But, as was seen in connection with the settlement of Palestine, the factor that went hand in hand with willingness to make economic sacrifice was the drive of some creative purpose, some dominating idea.

How might this condition be realized over a period of time in connection with the economic operations of a Bank, or whatever other institutions might be concerned? Is it possible that in the elaboration of approved settlement schemes, some regular participation in the planning might be accorded to the agencies dealing with refugee questions, thus bringing to bear a continuing sense of concern, and providing a reservoir of past experience? This kind of consultative relationship has in fact proved useful in the past, in connection with more than one intergovernmental body dealing with the refugee problem. Such cooperation between public and private agencies would prove of real value in connection with the future resettlement of displaced persons.

⁵⁸ "Labor Looks at Migration," by Mark Starr; *Current History*, December 1943; p. 303.

⁵⁹ It would appear from the comprehensive nature of the Articles of Agreement—notably, Article I, Paragraph 1, and Article III, Section 4—that the financing of resettlement schemes might properly come within the Bank's purview. (See *N. Y. Times*, July 24, 1944, for text of the Agreement.)

V. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The relocation of Europe's displaced population—victims of a displacement which is primarily but not exclusively a war phenomenon—will constitute a serious problem. It is not an isolated problem, but part of larger issues involving organized international political and economic cooperation. Nevertheless, it cannot be left in abeyance pending long-term measures; provisional solutions at least will be imperative.

Because of the complexity and variety of the problems to be solved, there is no royal road to relocation; a multiple and flexible approach is indicated. Mass repatriation will account for the overwhelming majority of displaced persons. But a numerically important residual group of those unable to return home for differing reasons will have to be given legal protection and assisted during varying periods of time pending individual or collective resettlement, or absorption in the areas of temporary residence.

SPECIFIC MEASURES

With the object of facilitating or speeding up the whole process of relocation at a number of points, the following specific measures are hereby recommended for consideration.

Organizational Procedures

(1) In order that action by UNRRA regarding displaced persons should be as simple and coordinate as possible, the terms of reference should be somewhat extended in three directions. *First*, UNRRA should assist any United Nation or neutral country, with the approval of the government concerned, where considerable numbers of displaced persons await relocation. *Secondly*, UNRRA should deal with displaced persons of enemy countries wherever they are found, when the government of the country where found approves. *Thirdly*, UNRRA'S operations should cover cases of displaced persons whose displacement is the result of events in Europe, during the inter-war period, which have endangered their lives or liberties on account of their race, religion or political beliefs.

(2) Similarly, the scope of the Intergovernmental Committee should be expanded, in close correlation with that of UNRRA. The I.G.C. should be empowered to deal with the relocation of dis-

placed persons who do not fall within the category of refugee as defined by the I.G.C.'s present terms of reference, but who have no place to which they can be repatriated or returned.

(3) In order that the continuing concern and specialized skills and experience of the private agencies may be fully utilized, the existing contacts between the private agencies, on the one hand, and the official bodies (e. g. UNRRA and the I.G.C.) on the other, should be developed into a regularized and responsible relationship.

Furthermore, there may well be occasions when the services of one or other private agency could with advantage be employed on a considerable scale by UNRRA or the I.G.C., under conditions to be determined by agreement, and with appropriate financial support.

Relocation Policies

(1) While care should be taken not to interfere with the urgent tasks of mass repatriation of United Nations nationals, or to thwart the very natural longing, felt by the overwhelming majority of displaced persons, to return home and reunite dispersed families, repatriation should not be dogmatically insisted upon. If and when good reasons, whether economic or other, are shown for another form of relocation, the procedures followed should be flexible enough to take account of strong personal preferences, or at least to give them full consideration.

(2) Where absorption—that is to say settlement in the place of temporary residence—is both desired and feasible, there would appear much to be said for it. So far as the United States is concerned, and in view of the initiative which this country has shown in efforts to assist refugees, it would be particularly unfortunate if, after the war, law-abiding persons temporarily resident here on visitors' visas, and with no prospect of settlement elsewhere, should be deported.

(3) Regarding resettlement of individuals by immigration, the generosity or stringency of immigration policies will be determined, in large measure, naturally enough, by the general level of economic prosperity and of employment. The relocation of the residual group of displaced persons, however, will present a common problem and a common responsibility.

It would be appropriate, therefore, that this country, in applying its immigration laws, should do so in a manner calculated to make

the maximum contribution to the relocation of displaced persons. For example, there will be many persons seeking to join their relatives who would in no way increase competition on the labor market or be likely to become a public charge.

In any case it would be desirable that within the limits of the regular quota system everything possible should be done to simplify administrative procedures and alleviate technical conditions which have often proved tremendous handicaps to refugees seeking entry to this country as immigrants.

(4) So far as group resettlement is concerned, a series of regional working conferences might perhaps be organized with representation of all the interested parties—governments, administrators, experts and technicians of various kinds, as well as private agencies and representatives of the refugees. These conferences should consider the practical ways and means of resettlement, and might especially seek to promote demonstration projects of various kinds.

Juridical Questions

(1) In view of the cardinal importance for all displaced persons of the sort of legal protection afforded to certain categories of refugees by the League of Nations, it is not too soon to consider what international authority might best discharge this function in the future, and whether the time has not come to extend such protection to all displaced persons who, for one reason or another, cannot be repatriated and who have not acquired another nationality. Presumably, such powers of protection could be vested in the Intergovernmental Committee, if its present terms of reference do not actually imply as much. Or they could be vested in whatever General International Organization may supersede the League of Nations.

(2) The problem of statelessness, moreover, calls for the most careful consideration. The least that should be done would be the granting of a provisional identity document, similar to the "Nansen Passport," facilitating travel and return, as well as work and residence.

The problem of the stateless person is not only that he is deprived of all rights, whether of travel, work or residence, but also that there is no one to represent him in negotiations with public authorities. Presumably stateless persons should come within any general protection accorded to refugees and other permanently

displaced persons. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the authority giving general protection should also be the one to undertake active negotiations on displaced persons' behalf where travel, work or residence are concerned.

GENERAL MEASURES

But the success of such specific measures as have been proposed above, and of the relocation of displaced persons, broadly speaking, will be largely dependent upon the degree of general international cooperation—economic and political.

Economic Cooperation

It falls outside the purview of this report to make specific proposals for international economic cooperation. But the following brief observations made in the light of actual or contemplated economic measures are permissible.

(1) It is self-evident that if the goals of full production and employment policies, adopted by the International Labor Conference in Philadelphia recently, are realized; then the problem of relocating displaced persons will be proportionately less.

(2) It is equally self-evident that the problem of repatriating, infiltrating, or absorbing displaced persons in territories devastated by the war will be made hard or easy in proportion as effective relief and industrial and agricultural rehabilitation for the general population are carried out through the agency of UNRRA, or in other ways.

(3) The same is true of long-term economic reconstruction. For example, it is obvious that if and when policies of industrialization, whether for undeveloped or dependent areas, are under review, the employment of displaced persons with technical or administrative skills could be envisaged as part of the general provision of the requisite manpower. Again, if and when the projected International Bank of Reconstruction and Development has been established, it would be possible to arrange for a department of the Bank which would specially consider the financing of group resettlement schemes, for example.

(4) Finally, in connection with economic measures, there would seem every reason why, in extension of the proposals for national Employment Services and for international exchange of information regarding employment statistics adopted by the I.L.O. at Philadelphia, a simple kind of international employment intelligence

service should be set up with displaced persons in view. It is outside the scope of this report to propose an employment clearing for migrant labor in general. What is suggested is something much simpler, namely an intelligence service the purpose of which would not merely be to provide for displaced persons the best information available concerning the possibilities of employment in various countries, but also to provide information to employers seeking new labor sources.

At any rate it is to be hoped that the I.L.O. in consultation with the I.G.C. and UNRRA will consider what steps might be taken to promote a specialized employment service for displaced persons.

Political Cooperation

It is still less within the scope of a report of this kind to enter the field of major political proposals. Nevertheless there is one self-evident proposition that may be ventured, and two suggestions touching vitally important general political attitudes towards displacements of population—actual or potential.

(1) It cannot be denied that one of the surest means of pacifying hates and minimizing fears in Europe and elsewhere would be the full and active participation of the United States in any over-all international organization to be set up by the United Nations. In fact, without such participation, the general political situation would be such that the outlook for displaced persons would be considerably darkened.

(2) One obvious defense against hates and fears would be a series of multilateral, or bilateral, agreements concerning the protection of minorities, always with the express understanding that the minorities themselves will be loyal to the State, and including internationally approved safeguards directed against irredentism and terrorism. It cannot be too strongly stated in this connection that the failure to protect minorities anywhere endangers human liberties everywhere: the whole history of the inter-war period confirms this.

(3) The tensions within States may be very great at the end of the war; and the temptation for dominant groups to eject nationals who are, or have been, political opponents would be proportionately strong. But if, as has been suggested above, majorities as well as minorities deserve consideration in connection with any international attempts to establish codes of human rights and duties, a

specially heavy obligation will rest upon the dominant group in any State not to force their political opponents upon other countries. In the words of Principle 2 of "The International Law of the Future":

Each State has a legal duty to see that conditions prevailing within its own territory do not menace international peace and order, and to this end it must treat its own population in a way which will not violate the dictates of humanity and justice or shock the conscience of mankind.⁶⁰

But it would be quite unrealistic to imagine that avoidance of the creation of yet further refugee problems will be achieved simply by a new tolerance upon the basis of the old *status quo*. The foregoing suggestions are not intended to disguise the fact that post-war political and psychological conditions will necessitate, even though some suffering may be involved, certain exchanges and transfers of population and the migration of many individuals from countries of origin to countries willing to receive them.

* * *

These are complicated, difficult, and often painful tasks and the reader might well be forgiven for regarding the outcome with a certain skepticism.

George Santayana has an encouraging word in this connection. He writes:

The difficult is that which can be done immediately; the impossible that which takes a little longer.

Such a maxim is axiomatic in waging war, where the impossible is essayed and accomplished all the time. The waging of peace demands the same spirit. Without it the problems of the post-war world will be insoluble. With it the solutions can and will be found.

⁶⁰ "The International Law of the Future—Postulates, Principles, Proposals: A Statement of a Community of Views by North Americans." *International Conciliation*, April 1944, No. 399; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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